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This is a non-exhaustive list of goals for hardening the Debian distribution, the Debian project and systems of Debian contributors and users. If you would like to help make Debian more secure, help on all of these topics is welcome. Don't be intimidated by the length of the list, pick the things you can do something about and put some time into them. If you aren't sure about how to start helping on a particular item, the debian-mentors list should be able to direct you.

Get more people to get involved in Debian so that we have enough people to maintain it into the future.
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Build all binary packages, installer images, preinstalled images and live images on official Debian machines (buildds etc).
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Package more tools for testing the security of both code and installed systems.

This is a non-exhaustive list of goals for hardening the Debian distribution, the Debian project and systems of Debian contributors and users. If you would like to help make Debian more secure, help on all of these topics is welcome. Don't be intimidated by the length of the list, pick the things you can do something about and put some time into them. If you aren't sure about how to start helping on a particular item, the debian-mentors list should be able to direct you.

Get more people to get involved in Debian so that we have enough people to maintain it into the future.

Improve our use of crypto on personal and Debian systems, including upgrading OpenPGP keys and moving them to off general purpose systems onto smartcards and similar.

Encourage more developers to use Tor so that they are less easily targeted by active attackers.

Build all binary packages, installer images, preinstalled images and live images on official Debian machines (buildds etc).

Implement reproducible builds (inc Linux), verifiable image builds and reproducible installs.

Recruit more people to join the security issue tracking effort.

Revive the security audit project.

Revive static analysis services like DACA, firewoes, debile etc.

Periodically send notifications of open vulnerabilities to maintainers.

Encourage package maintainers to check their packages using various tools before upload:

Package more tools for testing the security of both code and installed systems.

Educate upstreams about upstream best practices.

Work with programming language upstreams to eliminate entire classes of bugs. For example eliminate serialisation library misfeatures or the possibility of shell metacharacter injection.

Push the compiler flags hardening release goal. Push GCC/LLVM upstreams to enable these by default. Move the default compiler flags to using -fstack-protector-strong once GCC 4.9 is the default.

Enable various security features in the Linux kernel, for example hidepid fs.protected_symlinks etc.

Build a secondary high-security (but slower) archive using SoftBoundCETS or ASAN and similar for folks who prefer security to performance.

Provide grsec versions of the Linux kernel, see #605090 and the blog post by Yves-Alexis Perez.

Refuse to use proprietary software on our personal Debian development machines and on Debian project machines and switch to hardware with free and auditable firmware.

All of the above for code that we run but don't package.