Differences between revisions 1 and 2
Revision 1 as of 2013-12-04 01:14:18
Size: 7835
Editor: ?NickDaly
Comment: Created page.
Revision 2 as of 2015-01-16 12:15:04
Size: 7861
Comment: Add category FreedomBox
Deletions are marked like this. Additions are marked like this.
Line 34: Line 34:

Important details related to MAC addresses:

  • MAC addresses on Ethernet gear come in two parts: the company ID number, and the manufacturer-assigned extension number. The company ID reveals who built the Ethernet gear; the extension number is similar to a serial number. So, a database of MAC addresses can be used to find equipment made by particular manufacturers, for example if you know a vulnerability in that product as shipped and want to exploit it; or if you are a malevolent government intending to confiscate all hardware that's likely to be running FreedomBox software.

  • Apple iPhones record the MAC addresses that are nearby, report these to Apple, and Apple uses them to return a physical position fix. This is used to more rapidly cause the GPS algorithm to converge on a position, and also used when GPS isn't working. The phones often report their GPS position and any nearby MAC addresses back to Apple servers. (Apple formerly used startup Skyhook Wireless for this service, but ended up disintermediating them by covertly using their customers' iPhones to collect an equivalent database.) See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skyhook_Wireless It's easy for hackers to query that database of MAC addresses and locations, by pretending to be an iPhone seeking its location.

  • Google Street View vehicles recorded the MAC addresses of all accessible WiFi access points that they passed. Google then used this database to guess at the physical location of Android mobile phones who can also hear beacons from the same MAC addreses. Android phones may now be doing what iPhones do, reporting nearby MAC addresses plus the phone's GPS location to a Google server.

  • By default, every IPv6 interface's MAC address is in the low order bits of its IPv6 address. See RFC 4291 (IPv6 Addressing Architecture) Section 2.5.1 and Appendix A; RFC 2464 (Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Ethernet Networks); RFC 4862 (IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration); RFC 4941 (Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6). So, anyone who ever communicates with a machine via IPv6 will generally learn the MAC address of one of its interfaces, unless that machine specifically uses the RFC 4941 privacy extensions to generate a temporary random address and change it periodically. (In Linux, the default is to not use such temporary addresses; you can change that default by writing 1 to /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/default/use_tempaddr. You can change it for all current devices by writing to /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/use_tempaddr. If you want privacy, it's probably good to write a 1 to both.)
  • If someone who is in radio range of a WiFi access point can send it packets that cause it to communicate over the Internet, that someone can figure out the correlation between the access point's MAC address and the IP address (v4 or v6) it uses over the Internet. For example, connecting to the access point and then sending a DNS query for your own domain, will cause a DNS query packet to be forwarded to your own domain server, from the global IP address of the access point. Your domain server can then log that packet and correlate it with the access point's MAC address seen by the wireless device that generated it. Many closed access points handle DNS packets even before authentication, since they rely on Web page spoofing to force people to "log in" or "check a box to agree to terms". It's even simpler if the access point is open. If a police car crusing past a FreedomBox can cause it to access a police Internet DNS site, they can map the MAC address to the IP address of that FreedomBox.

So, there are two aspects of MAC addresses that are problematic: that they are long-term identifiers, and that they actually reveal things about that device.

If upon installation the FreedomBox software merely changed each machine's MAC address to a random value, we'd solve the second problem (avoid revealing who made the device). However it's trickier than that, since we may not have a good source of randomness at installation time (making our addresses too predictable), and also, devices that have a random MAC address (instead of one assigned to a company on the IEEE-maintained registry of Ethernet manufacturers) might make it too obvious that the manufacturer's MAC address had been overwritten, which would lead totalitarians to pay more attention.

We could carefully pick a random number and then package it into a MAC address that looks like it comes from a popular manufacturer. For example, we could have a table of a hundred big manufacturers, and for each, the known range of "serial number" bits that they shipped. We'd use part of our random number to pick a manufacturer, and another part to pick a valid-looking serial number within that manufacturer's products. To avoid drawing scrutiny, we might have to be more selective, e.g. avoid putting a MAC address from a 10-megabit 1990s 3Com Ethernet card onto a 2010s WiFi link.

Changing the MAC address to a packaged random value *periodically* -- perhaps daily or weekly -- would solve the first problem of its being a long-term identifier. IPv6 can cope with that without trouble; it encourages interfaces to have multiple IPv6 addresses, deprecating old ones while allowing existing communications to work. IPv4 can also cope with changed MAC addresses; within seconds, any neighbor on the Ethernet or radio who is communicating with the node will know the new MAC address that matches the same old IPv4 address.

We would have to test any new candidate MAC address, before using it, by trying to communicate with it and seeing if anything responds. See the "Duplicate Address Detection" algorithm in RFC 4862.

  • "If preventing people from being identified by MAC addresses should be a goal, how do we accomplish that? The MAC address can, but shouldn't be set in the firmware: we can't update the firmware to change or set the MAC address from the running system. That's good, because it implies that the bootloader can't be changed on a running system."

MAC addresses in all modern networking chips can be set from software.

I think what you mean is that the *default* MAC address is stored in flash, near where the boot firmware is stored, and that some boards running Linux can't rewrite that flash memory. "Can't" is probably too strong a word -- many can, but how to do so is often merely undocumented, providing a little security-by-obscurity.

  • "So, where can we set the MAC address? The obvious solution is to put it into /etc/networking/interfaces, but that'll harm folks who want some form of anonymity. We can use 0:0:0:0:0:0 as a default MAC address in /etc/networking/interfaces and folks who want to set a static one can edit the file to set it there, while folks who want to use a MAC changer can run a service hooked through Plinth."

"ifconfig DEV hwaddr xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx" or "ip link set DEV xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx" lets you set the MAC address of DEV at any time from a shell, as root. There is also an equivalent low level interface.

We can't set 0:0:0:0:0:0 as every interface's MAC address. There is good reason to have unique addresses on Ethernet interfaces. On a given Ethernet, or in a given WiFi radio range, communication will fail if multiple interfaces have the same address (unless those interfaces specifically coordinate with each other, e.g. are plugged into the same node and use custom software to pretend to be a single interface). If you and your neighbor both have a FreedomBox with WiFi address 0:0:0:0:0:0, there will be no way to send a packet to YOUR FreedomBox; your neighbor's box will also receive the packet and is just as likely to respond to it -- which will confuse the communication when BOTH boxes respond to it.